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Tariffs, subsidies and profits: a re-assessment of structural change 




This paper offers a re-interpretation of the drivers of structural change in Australia from 
federation until the outbreak of World War II. The broad story of structural change is that 
manufacturing increased its relative share of both output and employment while the share 
of the farm sector and mining contracted. The large tertiary sector, including 
construction, oscillated around its mean. The conventional wisdom is that these shifts 
were largely the result of government policy, particularly the increase in trade barriers 
that stimulated import substitution by manufacturers. However, if the unit of analysis is 
the firm rather than the economy then a wider range of possibilities come into view. We 
contend that profit maximizing firms responded to changing relative profits between and 
within sectors that shifted in response to more sources of stimuli than tariffs and 
subsidies. These included exogenous shifts in consumer preferences and a number of 
changes on the supply side: the adoption of new technologies, changing factor 
proportions, and greater specialization in manufacturing and services generating positive 





In the first half of the twentieth century the Australian economy made a substantial shift 
away from its reliance on resource-based industries. Manufacturing industry lifted its 
share of both output and employment. Nearly all of the growth in the share of 
manufacturing was accounted for by a reduction of the share of the farm and mining 
sectors. A very large tertiary sector, comprising services and construction, oscillated 
around its trend. The data sets of GDP, employment and capital formation generated by 
Butlin and others1 provide the starting point for discussion. These data will be reviewed 
in the first section of the paper.  
 
The conventional explanation of the relative rise of manufacturing rests largely on the 
role of the tariff. Rising levels of tariff protection enabled local producers to capture a 
larger share of the market from increasingly expensive imports. This literature on 
structural change will be discussed in the second section. The paper will then proceed by 
arguing that the previous explanations of sectoral change do not provide a convincing 
account of the rise of manufacturing relative to the primary sector let alone the rise and 
fall of industries within manufacturing and the large services sector. New data of profits 
at the industry level promises to provide a more accurate picture of the changing choice 
                                                 
1 Butlin, N. G. Australian Domestic Product, Investment and Foreign Borrowing 1861-1939 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1962); M. Keating, The Australian Workforce 1910-11 to 1960-61 (Canberra: 
Australian National University, 1973); Butlin, N. G. and J. A. Dowie ‘Estimates of Australian workforce 
and employment 1861-1961’, Australian Economic History Review, IX, 1969, pp. 38-55. 
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set facing people making strategic decisions about where to do business.2 These data 
highlight the role of both changes in output prices, as captured in the discussion of tariffs 
and subsidies, and developments on the supply side. Technological change, endogenous 
and exogenous, transformed the landscape of relative profitability. Much of the changing 
structure of the Australian economy was the result of the emergence of new industries 
founded on new production possibilities. There was a sequential dimension to this 
process with the developments up stream in the generation of new sources of energy, 
particularly electricity, being a precondition for changes down stream. 
 
Structural change 1901-1939 
 
The structure of the Australian economy altered in many ways in the first half of the 
twentieth century. The big picture is a relative growth of manufacturing that is nearly 
offset by a contraction in rural and mining activity with the large service sector remaining 
at a roughly constant figure. National income account data of product indicate shifts in 
the relative importance at a sector level.3 The broad shifts revealed by these indicators are 
mirrored by changes in the distribution of the workforce.4 Research on particular sectors, 
industries or regions provides evidence of absolute expansion or decline that adds detail 
and nuance to the broad sweep of the aggregate data, including the shifting balance 
between the size of the public and private sector.5  
 
Together the GDP and employment series demonstrate the broad sweep of change in the 
structure of the economy from 1901 up to WWII. The data is shown in Tables 1 and 2 
below. Manufacturing grew significantly both in terms of its share of employment, from 
15 to 24 per cent, and its share of output, 13 to 18 per cent, from a low base. Its 
expansion was broadly matched by the contraction in the primary sector, a decline in 
share of employment from 33 to 24 per cent and a fall in share of output from 37 to 28 
per cent. Services, to which the utilities of gas, electricity and water, and construction are 
added to become the tertiary sector, were the cornerstone of the economy with a largely 
unchanged contribution as an employer and income generator at around the low 50 per 
cent for both employment and product. 
 
Table 1 about here 
                                                 
2 See Simon Ville and David Merrett, ‘A time series for business profitability in twentieth-century 
Australia’, Australian Economic Review, 39, 3, September 2006, pp. 330-39. 
3 Butlin, Australian Domestic Product; Idem, ‘Some perspectives of Australian economic development, 
1890-1965’, in Colin Forster, ed., Australian Economic Development in the Twentieth Century (London 
and Sydney: George Allen & Unwin and Australasian Publishing Company), 1970, pp. 266-327; Dowie, J. 
A. ‘The service ensemble’ in Forster, ed., Australian Economic Development, pp. 208-65;  
4 Keating, Australian Workforce. 
5 Forster, C., Industrial Development in Australia 1920-1930 (Canberra: Australian National University), 
1970; Snooks, G. D., Depression and Recovery in Western Australia, 1928/29-1938/39: A Study in Cyclical 
and Structural Change (Nedlands, WA: University of Western Australia Press), 1974; Barnard, A. and N. 
G. Butlin, ‘Australian public and private capital formation, 1901-75’, Economic Record, 1981, pp.354-67; 
Sinclair, W. A., ‘Capital formation’, in Forster, ed., Australian Economic Development, pp. 11-65; 
Mathews, R. L. and W. R. C. Jay, Federal Finance: Intergovernmental Financial Relations in Australia 




Table 2 about here 
 
 
The data are widely recognized as robust indicators of trends. However, there are 
difficulties in using them as measures of structural change. The two key references are 
Butlin (1962) and Keating (1973) who constructed the long term estimates of national 
accounts and workforce data respectively. These series have been subject to commentary 
and revisions.6 There are a number of problems. These data rely heavily on the 
Production Bulletins covering farming, mining and manufacturing and the population 
Census. The very large service sector is practically invisible. Attempts to calculate its 
output are bedeviled by the intangible nature of the product. Valuations of its inputs are 
used instead. This places great reliance on the accuracy of the employment series in 
services, which rest heavily on inter-census interpolation that masks year to year 
fluctuations, and wage data that is less than comprehensive. Further conceptual and 
practical issues arise in drawing boundaries between the sectors. Some authors, such as 
Dowie, aggregate the nine industry classification used by Butlin to a threefold 
classification, viz, primary, secondary and tertiary.7 This process involves making 
important decisions about boundaries, particularly about whether mining should be 
included with the rural sector or with manufacturing, and whether industries such as 
construction and utilities that have tangible product should be separated from ‘services’.  
 
If our purpose is to trace the changing structure of the economy over time then data at the 
highest level of disaggregation is most useful. The industry classifications adopted in the 
Production Bulletins are too broad to identify the supply side responses to changes in 
relative profitability. The industry sub-divisions, akin to two-digit ANZSIC data, and 
sub-categories, the equivalent of the three-digit ANZSIC data, disguise as much as they 
reveal. This data was simply not fine grained enough to allow the observation of the 
emergence of new industries, products or processes as they happened. The first 
Manufacturing statistics were published in the Production Bulletin in 1907. From that 
time until a major revision of the manufacturing sub-divisions in 1931 the number of 
industries classified had risen from 100 to 115. From 1931 there were 146.8 Similar 
problems arose when classifying workers amongst occupations. In his Report about the 
1933 Census the Statistician concluded that ‘the taxonomic problem [of classifying 
occupations] is never completely solved. It is complicated by the development of new 
                                                 
6 See references in note 2 above. 
7 Maddock and McLean follow Boehm in using four: ‘farming’, ‘mining’, ‘manufacturing’ and ‘other’. 
Rodney Maddock and Ian W. McLean, ‘The Australian economy in the very long run’, in R. Maddock and 
I. W. McLean, eds., The Australian Economy in the Long Run (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 
1987, Table 1.2, 19. 
8 The original classification of manufacturing industries adopted by the Conference of Statisticians in 1902 
remained in use until 1931. At the beginning there were 19 ‘industries’ and 100 sub-categories. By 1929-30 
the number of sub-categories had increased to 115. Moreover, a number of the sub-categories had also been 
moved between ‘industries’. Two of the ‘industries’, Class XI ‘vehicles’ and XVIII ‘leather’, had been 
reclassified to comprise motor vehicles and rubber goods respectively. Subsequent to the revision of 1930-
31 there were fewer industrial sub-divisions, 16, but many more sub-categories, 146. Commonwealth 
Bureau of Census and Statistics, Production Bulletin 1931 (Canberra: Government Printer). 
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fields of industrial enterprise and by the splitting and overlapping of fields previously 
conventionally definable, by the emergence of new occupations, crafts and callings, [and] 
by the further specialization and division of labour…’9
 
Explanations of Structural Change 
 
Describing the structural transformation has proven to be more straightforward than 
explaining what caused it to take place. The aggregate data captures the net outcome of 
hundreds of thousands of decisions taken by businesses and households in any year. The 
‘shape’ of the economy10 altered continuously as entrepreneurs, investors and workers 
readjusted their behaviours in the light of a set of price signals. The most relevant sets of 
information were the terms of trade between industries11 and the relative profitability of 
firms between industries, the latter showing the return to investing in a bundle of 
resources to produce those goods and services.  
 
The existing literature has focused most of its attention on one set of price signals, tariffs 
and subsidies. Tariffs rose from 1907 onwards driving a wedge between domestic and 
‘free trade’ prices for manufactures.12 There are two indices of the ‘height’ of the tariff. 
The first is a simple average of the revenue collected divided by the value of net imports, 
both dutiable and total, entering the country in the same year.13 Graph 1 shows that the 
average rate of duty paid on those imports on which duty was payable remained roughly 
constant from 1903 until the beginning of WWI when it fell until 1921 before rising 
above pre-war levels before the onset of the 1929 depression. Average rates rose sharply 
thereafter, inflated by primage duty that was levied from 1931 until 1939. The ratio of 
duty paid on all imports followed the same broad pattern although the percentage of 
imports admitted free of duty fluctuated by rising before the WWI, falling in the 1920s 
                                                 
9 Statistician’s Report, Census of the Commonwealth of Australia, 1933 (Canberra: Government Printer), 
Vol. 3, 214. 
10 Butlin, N. G., ‘The shape of the Australian economy 1861-1900’, Economic Record, 34, 1, 1958, pp. 10-
29. 
11 ‘… the intersectoral terms of trade…governed resource allocation within the domestic economy.’ Mark 
Thomas, ‘Manufacturing and economic recovery in Australia, 1932-1937’, in R. G. Gregory and N. G. 
Butlin, eds, Recovery from the Depression: Australia and the World economy in the 1930s (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press), 1988, p. 269.  
12 For a discussion of changes in the tariff see A. J. Reitsma, Trade Protection in Australia (Brisbane: 
University of Queensland Press), 1960, chapter 2; Kym Anderson and Ross Garnaut, Australian 
Protectionism: Extent, Causes and Effects (Sydney: Allen & Unwin), 1987, chapters 2 & 4. The tariff was 
subject to broad revisions in 1908, 1911, 1914, 1921, 1926 and 1928 before the introduction of a host of 
emergency measures in the Scullin Tariff between August 1929 and July 1931. Tariff schedules were 
further affected in the 1930s as Australia offered increased preference to Britain and other trading partners 
through its participation in the Ottawa Agreement in 1932 and the ill-fated trade diversion policies of the 
late 1930s. The introduction of preferential tariffs from 1908 meant that the rate of duty differed according 
to the country from which the import was sourced. One imported item, bottled beer for instance, may pay 
several rates of duty depending on the country of origin. Furthermore, the Tariff Board, established in 
1921, made numerous alterations to duties on individual items through out the 1920s and 1930s. G. J. R. 
Linge, Index of Australian Tariff Board Reports 1901-1961 (Canberra: Australian National University), 
1964. 
13 Australia, Overseas Trade Bulletin (Canberra: Government Printer), various. 
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and rising again in the 1930s.14 The simple average method has a downward bias in that, 
ceteris paribus, the higher the rate of duty the lower the value of imports and so the less 
duty collected. Another study has recalculated the data, using a sample of commodities 
for which corresponding import and production figures are available, using local 
production and imports as the denominator.15 This series, an index, shows higher rates of 
increase in the ‘weight’ of the tariff than the simple average especially during the 1920s.  
 




Governments also altered the ratio of domestic to ‘free trade’ prices through other means, 
primarily subsidies to domestic producers. Bounties and subsidies were paid to producers 
in many industries. However, the farming industries were the major recipients. The form 
of subsidy ranged from producers receiving cash grants through to being provided with 
transport services at less than cost and price support schemes.16 A number of attempts 
were made in the late 1920s and 1930s to estimate the value of this assistance.17 The 
authors of The Australian Tariff calculated that the subsidy equivalent of the tariff to 
manufacturing was £26m in 1926-27 while primary industries were not far behind 
receiving £22m. By 1932-33, the subsidy equivalent paid to primary industry had risen to 
£29m with the amount going to manufacturing having fallen to £19m.18   
 
Contemporary economists decried the allocative effect of tariffs and subsidies.19 They 
argued, in some memorable prose, that these policies distorted markets in ways that led to 
a loss of national welfare. Shann, for instance, wrote in 1929 of the creation a system of 
                                                 
14 The impact of the revised tariff schedules was two-fold. Rates were increased and more goods were made 
dutiable. Applying the 1908-11 and 1914 tariff schedules to the 1913 imports demonstrated that the average 
rate on all imports was increased from 16.75 per cent to 21.48 per cent as a result of the new schedule. The 
value of dutiable imports rose from £44.6m to £51.0m. Commonwealth Year Book of Australia 1914 
(Canberra: Government Printer), p. 603. The same calculation comparing the impact of the 1921 tariff 
schedule with that of 1908-11 showed that the average rate of duty on all imports was 22.46 per cent in 
1921, little more than in 1914. However, the percentage of imports admitted duty free had fallen from 55 
per cent in under the 1908-11 schedule to 42.96 per cent under the 1914 schedule to 29.12 per cent in 1921. 
Commonwealth Year Book of Australia 1921 (Canberra: Government Printer), pp. 503-05. 
15 A. T. Carmody, ‘The level of the Australian tariff: a study in method’, Yorkshire Bulletin of Economic 
and Social Research, 4, 1, 1952, pp. 51-65. 
16 See F. W. Eggleston, State Socialism in Victoria (London: P. S. King & Son), 1932; N. G. Butlin, A. 
Barnard and J. J. Pincus, Government and Capitalism: Public and Private Choice in Twentieth Century 
Australia (Sydney: George Allen & Unwin), 1982. 
17 L. F. Giblin, ‘Some costs of marketing control’, Economic Record, IV, Supplement, February, 1928, pp. 
148-54; J. B. Bridgen, et.al., The Australian Tariff: An Economic Enquiry (Melbourne: Melbourne 
University Press in association with Macmillan & Co.), 1929, Part IV and Appendices N and O; and J. F. 
Nimmo, ‘The effect of the tariff on the Australian consumption standard’, in F. W. Eggleston, et.al., 
Australian Standards of Living (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press in association with Oxford 
University Press) 1939, pp. 118-19. 
18 Nimmo, ‘Effect of the tariff’, p. 121. 
19 Benham, Prosperity of Australia, chapter 5; Bridgen, et.al., The Australian Tariff; Giblin, ‘Costs of 
marketing control’. 
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‘faked prices’ that ‘deranges and weakens [the] whole economy.’20 Benham asserted that 
‘there has been deliberate interference with the “price-mechanism,”’21 likening this to the 
actions of a ‘Dictator.’22 All agreed that Australia’s comparative advantage lay in its 
resource-based industries. The farm and mining industries were exporters who of 
necessity accepted the world price for their products. In contrast, manufacturing and 
services were sheltered from world markets, the former because of tariffs and the latter 
by its non-tradeable nature. The export sector could not pass on higher costs to its 
customers whereas the sheltered industries could. Tariffs raised the input costs of the 
export sector so narrowing its margins. Moreover, increases in domestic prices feed back 
into higher wages through an indexation mechanism.23 By the late 1920s there was 
serious concern that the process may have gone too far by threatening the viability of the 
export industries. The rapid increase in the level of assistance being given to the minor 
rural industries even before the onset of the 1930s depression served to reinforce the 
point. As Giblin so famously wrote:  
The vision that comes is of Australia as one enormous sheep bestriding a 
bottomless pit, with statesman, lawyer, miner, landlord, farmer and factory hand 
all hanging on desperately to the locks of its abundant fleece. The limits to 
protection are set by what the sheep will carry, and there are definite limits to that, 
even if the threat of synthetic wool remains only a threat.24
 
The debate about the welfare loss associated with the tariff has continued to the present 
day. Anderson and Garnaut, encapsulate the prevailing view with the statement that ‘one 
of the most robust conclusions from economic theory is that protection reduces per capita 
national income of a small economy.’25 The analysis undertaken by Bridgen and his co-
authors has been revised over the years by more formal and increasingly sophisticated 
modeling.26 This literature that draws heavily from international trade theory passes over 
the issue of the mechanism by which tariffs caused manufacturing to grow relative to the 
rest of the economy in terms of the resources it used and its share of product.  
 
The link between tariffs and subsidies and the relative expansion of manufacturing in the 
economy is made most clearly by Benham. Tariffs result in higher domestic prices than 
would be the case under free trade and also permit the manufacturer to pay higher money 
wages. He argues that ‘“protected” industries are thus rendered more profitable, and more 
capital and labour therefore flows towards them, than would be the case under free 
                                                 
20 E. Shann, An Economic History of Australia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1948, p.447. 
21 Benham, Prosperity of Australia, p. 139. 
22 Benham, Prosperity of Australia, p. 137. 
23 Keith Hancock, ‘The first half century of Australian wage policy – Part 2’, Journal of Industrial 
Relations, 21, 1979, pp. 129-60. 
24 Giblin, ‘Costs of marketing control’, p.154. 
25 Kym Anderson and Ross Garnaut, Australian Protectionism: Extent, Causes and Effects (Sydney: Allen 
& Unwin), 1987, p. 12. 
26 William Coleman, Selwyn Cornish and Alf Hagger, Giblin’s Platoon: The Trials and Triumph of the 
Economist in Australian Public Life (Canberra: ANU E Press), 2006, pp. 56-73 & 8083; Rod Tyers and 
William Colman, ‘Beyond Brigden: Australia’s pre-war manufacturing tariffs, real wages and economic 
size’, presented at conference on: Globalisation in Asia and the Pacific before the Modern Era, Australian 
National University, 30 June – 1 July 2005; Prema-chandra Athukorala and Satish Chand, ‘Tariff-growth 
nexus in the Australian economy, 1870-2002: Is there a paradox?’, unpublished paper. 
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trade.’27 Moreover, ‘…labour and resources are deliberately diverted away from non-
protected industries and towards protected industries, or, broadly speaking, away from 
Primary Production and towards Manufacturing.’28 The question is how much of the shift 
towards manufacturing was the result of such policies? Benham equivocates noting that 
the share of workers in the primary sector had fallen secularly in advanced economies as 
a result of technological change. He concludes that the tariff had really operated at the 
margin, as under free trade ‘Manufacturing would have expanded to a somewhat smaller 
extent, and in a somewhat different way.’29 The structure of manufacturing was altered as 
‘labour and resources were diverted to the more highly protected Manufacturing 
industries.’30  
 
This proposition can be tested with two sets of data. The first draws on information about 
the average rate of duty for 76 sub-categories of manufacturing industries, the equivalent 
of three-digit ANZSIC, for the year 1932-33.31 The sample covers 66 per cent of the 
industry sub-categories and contains 51 per cent of total employment. We tested the 
relationship between the height of the tariff, as measured by the simple average of 
customs duty paid divided by the value of imports, and the numbers employed in each of 
the industries receiving protection. Conventional regression analysis showed that the 
errors were not normally distributed. The regression was re-run having logged the data. 
The null hypothesis that there is no association between tariff levels and the size of 
resources in an industry, using employment as a proxy, was rejected. The t statistic is 
1.834055 and the P-value 0.070612, which is slightly beyond the 5 per cent limit. 
However, the adjusted R2 is only 3 per cent, so we can conclude that no significant 
explanatory relationship existed between tariffs and employment.  The results are shown 
in full in Appendix 1.  
 
However, this test does not capture other influences that might effect employment by 
industries. Another test was undertaken to test the relationship between changes in tariff 
levels and changes in employment for a smaller set of industries. This procedure was 
possible because of data that aligns ‘industry’ employment data with corresponding tariff 
‘rates’ at the two-digit ANZSIC level. From 1919 the Statistician published data that 
allocates imports to appropriate class of the customs’ schedules.32 We have selected ten 
manufacturing ‘industries’ that best approximate the activities covered by the customs 
classifications in 1918-19, 1928-29 and 1938-39.33 These industries account for 85, 87 
                                                 
27 Benham, Prosperity of Australia, p. 138. 
28 Benham, Prosperity of Australia, p. 139. 
29 Benham, Prosperity of Australia, p. 146. Emphasis in the original. 
30 Benham, Prosperity of Australia, p.162. 
31 Nimmo, ‘The effect of the tariff’, Appendix B, pp. 154-57. Only those industries were selected for whom 
matching employment data could be found in the Production Bulletin 1932-33, Table 110, pp. 77-81.  
32 The classifications used by the Statistician with respect to manufacturing output and employment, 
imports and duty payable in the Production Bulletin and Overseas Trade Bulletin differ significantly. 
33 They are, using the 1928-29 Production Bulletin classifications, ‘Stone, clay and glass’, ‘Oils and fats’ 
and ‘Drugs and chemicals’, Metal works, machinery’, ‘Jewellery’, ‘Clothing and textiles’, ‘Leather’, ‘Food 
and drink’, ‘Working in wood’ and ‘Furniture, bedding’, and ‘Musical instruments’. The corresponding 
Customs classifications are ‘Earthenware, cement, china, glass and stone’, ‘Drugs and chemicals’ and 
‘Oils, paints and varnishes’, ‘Metals and machinery’, ‘Jewellery and fancy goods’, ‘Textiles’, ‘Hides, 
leather and rubber’, ‘Agricultural products and groceries’, ‘Wood, wicker and cane’, ‘Paper and stationery, 
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and 91 per cent of all manufacturing employment at those dates. Multiple regression 
analysis is employed to determine the extent of causality. Changes in the average rate of 
duty between 1918-19 and 1928-29 and then between 1928-29 and 1938-39 are the 
independent variables. Changes in employment, as a proxy for resources used in each 
industry, for the same periods are the dependent variable. Each industry has a dummy 
variable. The null hypothesis that there is no relationship is confirmed as the t statistics is 
-0.707929 and the P-value 0.496912, well beyond the 5 per cent limit. The results are 
shown in full in Appendix 11.34
 
Further doubt has been cast on the link between changes in tariff rates and the expansion 
of manufacturing by Mark Thomas in his study of recovery from the 1930s depression.35 
His analysis of the role of import substitution as a contributor to output growth 
throughout the inter-war period demonstrates that there was no simple relationship 
between increases in tariffs, and devaluation, and declining import penetration. The 1921 
tariff and further revisions in 1926 and 1928 did not result in increased import 
substitution.36 The decomposition of output growth shows that import substitution made a 
negative contribution to the growth of total expenditure between 1919-20 and 1928-29.37 
In marked contrast there was a sharp increase in the contribution of import substitution 
between 1928-29 and 1931-32. However, Thomas argues that this resulted more from the 
increased competitiveness of Australian manufacturing as domestic costs fell than from 
the impact of either the Scullin Tariff or devaluation. Moreover, import substitution 
played a negative role during the recovery phase after 1932 up to the outbreak of the war. 
He concludes that ‘the contribution of massive import substitution to Australian recovery 
appears on such evidence to be a myth.’38
 




Benham and others have argued that the profits of manufacturers rose as tariffs rose. 
Local producers, it is alleged, will charge higher prices as tariffs rise because they can be 
‘passed on.’39 Increased average revenues are assumed to result in higher profits. This is 
not necessarily the case. Let us suppose that imports and domestic products are perfect 
substitutes40, and that imports make up 20 per cent of the market. A new tariff of 10 per 
cent is imposed on imports that results in zero demand for those products. What is the 
appropriate response of the local firms if they are profit-maximizing? Let us also suppose 
                                                                                                                                                 
and ‘Musical instruments’.  We have excluded customs revenues gathered for ‘Ale, spirits and beverages’ 
and ‘Tobacco and preparations thereof’ and ‘Sugar’ as the former two were the equivalent of excise while 
the import of sugar was effectively prohibited. 
34 The results were statistically significant for four individual industries – bricks, metals, jewellery, and 
clothing. 
35 Thomas, ‘Manufacturing’, pp. 246-71. 
36 Thomas, ‘Manufacturing’, p. 252. 
37 Thomas, ‘Manufacturing’, Table 11.2, p. 255. 
38 Thomas, “Manufacturing’, p. 255. 
39 Brigden, et.al., The Australian Tariff, Part V, ‘Passing on of excess cost’. 
40 A questionable assumption. See Thomas, ‘Manufacturing’ pp. 249-51. 
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that each firm was in an equilibrium position, with marginal cost and marginal revenues 
equal, before the onset of the tariff. How will they respond to the tariff? They can raise 
their price to the pre-tariff price plus duty. Demand will fall correspondingly. However, 
by taking this action their marginal revenues will rise above marginal costs. Profit 
maximizing behaviour will lead each firm to increase its supply back to the pre-tariff 
production level so reducing the price. If the new price, with 80 per cent of the pre-tariff 
demand being supplied, exceeds the pre-tariff price existing firms in the industry will 
have an incentive to increase supply and/or new entrants would start production as long 
as they can do so without marginal costs exceeding marginal revenues. Production would 
increase to the point where the 20 per cent of the market supplied by imports has been 
met locally. The price would fall back to the pre-tariff level as long as there is a 
competitive market. 
 
Those making the argument in the 1920s that an increase in tariffs would increase profits 
had seen fit to qualify the case. By raising prices after a tariff increase firms would 
trigger a subsequent increase in costs. Cost rises were of two sorts. The first came from 
the centralized wage system that automatically adjusted the Basic Wage to movements in 
price indexes that measured the ‘cost of living’. A combination of higher prices for 
imports and domestic goods would feed through into quarterly ‘cost of living’ 
adjustments.41 Secondly, insofar as firms relied on imported inputs their costs were 
increased.42 In its Reports in the 1920s the Tariff Board lamented that firms were using 
the increase costs as a rationale for greater protection and expressed alarm at the growing 
divergence between money wages in Australian and overseas.43 The impact on the 
margins earned by firms of these costs pressures would once again depend on industry 
and firm-specific factors. Industries with lower labour-capital ratios would have greater 
immunity than labour intensive operations. Moreover, industries will less reliance on 
imported inputs were better placed to cope. Whatever the industry effects might be it is 
hard to escape the conclusion that the supposed positive stimulus to profits given by 
tariffs in the first instance were quickly moderated by these feedback loops. 
 
The impact of tariffs on profitability will depend on industry and firm-specific reactions. 
First, the elasticity of supply of the domestic industry matters.44 Competitive industries 
are more likely to increase their supply so reducing price below the post-tariff import 
price than more highly concentrated ones. Local monopolies can set a price to maximize 
profits. Industries with binding cartel agreements could hold prices above competitive 
levels after the tariff was imposed. How competitive was Australian manufacturing in the 
first four decades of the twentieth century? The prevailing view is that many industries 
had high levels of seller concentration and/or engaged in collusive behaviour especially 
                                                 
41 See references in note 23 above. 
42 Roughly three-quarters of imports were producer goods. Thomas, ‘Manufacturing’, p. 266 and notes 14 
& 15. 
43 Brigden, et.al., The Australian Tariff, Appendix C. 
44 ‘…the capacity to increase prices differs greatly between …industries. It depends upon the conditions of 
supply and demand for the goods produced. Where demand is fairly rigid, and the supply is responsive to 
market conditions, the necessary increase in prices may be almost automatic. Differences in conditions of 
supply are probably the more important causes of differences in capacity to increase prices to cover the 
costs imposed.’ Brigden, et.al., The Australian Tariff, p.53 
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with respect to price agreements.45 A recent study has found that the increase in seller 
concentration in many manufacturing industries before WWII was the result of the 
adoption of new technologies that allowed for significant economies of scale.46 Barriers 
to entry rose quickly in those industries where firms could reap economics of scale or 
establish powerful brands.47 Firms enjoying market power defended their above normal 
returns behind barriers to entry that became increasingly difficult for new entrants to 
breach. Incumbency delivered more than scale economies in production. That advantage 
was reinforced by privileged access to technology through patents or licensing 
agreements, registered trade marks and brand acceptance, established relationships with 
suppliers and distributors, internally generated competencies gained by experience, 
superior organizational design, and privileged access to finance through retained earnings 
and the ability to raise debt and equity more cheaply.48 However, these barriers were 
breached if the rewards on offer were large enough. There was entry into even highly 
concentrated industries such as glass, rubber tyres and confectionary by both foreign and 
domestic firms.49 A recent study has shown that profitability and new capital issues, both 
in manufacturing and the economy as a whole, followed very similar trajectories through 
the interwar period. This would suggest that new investment flowed unimpeded into 
profitable industries and products.50
 
Technological change and changes in labour-capital ratios were commonplace in the 
economy. Often the two were associated as technology was embodied in new machinery 
that reduced the need for labour or substituted lower cost process workers for craftsmen. 
The importance of these developments has been underplayed in the literature, which has 
focused its attention on the gap between productivity levels in Australia and overseas. 
Our concern is on the impact of such investments on relative profitability amongst firms 
within the domestic industry. In such circumstances, competitive advantage amongst 
firms within an industry could swing in favour of those undertaking most investment in 
new production methods. Firms with lower costs had an incentive to increase supply to 
the point where the new equilibrium price was lower than the pre-tariff price. Is there 
evidence to support this argument? Colin Forster concluded after a careful review of the 
data that ‘although it is impossible to measure with precision the growth of 
manufacturing productivity in Australia during the 1920s, general considerations indicate 
                                                 
45 Butlin, Barnard and Pincus, Government and Capitalism: Public and Private Choice in Twentieth 
Century Australia (Sydney: George Allen & Unwin), 1982, chp. 4. See also H. L. Wilkinson, The Trust 
Movement in Australia (Melbourne: Critchley Parker), 1914; J. N. Rawlings, Who Owns Australia? 
(Melbourne: Left Book Club), 1937. 
46 Fleming, Merrett and Ville, The Big End of Town, pp. 85-88. Cf. Forster, ‘Economies of scale’. 
47 Joe S. Bain, Barriers to New Competition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), 1956. 
48 Fleming, Merrett and Ville, The Big End of Town, pp.  
49 H. Fountain, ‘Technology acquisition, firm capability and sustainable competitive advantage: A study of 
Australian Glass Manufacturers Ltd, 1915-39’, in D. Merrett, ed, Business Institutions and Behaviour in 
Australia (London: Frank Cass), 2000, pp. 89-108; T. Barker, ‘Pilkington: the reluctant multinational’ in G. 
Jones, ed, British Multinationals: Origins, Management and Performance (Aldershot: Gower), 1986, pp. ; 
G. Jones, ‘Multinational chocolate: Cadbury overseas’, Business History, 26, 1984, pp. ; J. Stanton, 
‘Protection, market structure and firm behaviour: inefficiency in the early Australia tyre industry’, 
Australian Economic History Review, 42, 2, 1984, pp.  
50 Merrett, Parnell and Ville, ‘Capital Formation and Structural Change in Interwar Australia’. 
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that the increase was substantial.’51 Mark Thomas argues that Australian manufacturing 
increased in competitiveness vis-a-vis imports in the 1930s through a combination of ‘the 
increased efficiency of Australian industry and declining input prices.’52 This resulted in 
part from the growth of the local market that permitted the realization of economies of 
scale in some industries but, Forster suggests, was insufficient to provide minimum 
efficient scale for those capital-intensive and science-based industries of the second 
industrial revolution.53 However, new technologies were adopted in many industries that 
provided an opportunity for incumbents or entrants to reshape the nature of ‘rivalry’.54 
Moreover, there was the substitution of machinery for labour on a large scale across a 
wide range of industries. Once again, there were marked differences in the extent and 
timing of this process between industries that could explain the reconfiguration of 
industry structure.55  
 
Rural industries and the burden of ‘excess costs’
 
The counter point to the rise of manufacturing was the decline of the farm and mining 
industries. The earlier literature makes a clear connection between the two events. Costs 
in the export sector were pushed higher because of higher wage and input costs resulting 
from tariff protection. Unlike the ‘sheltered’ industries, the exporting rural and mining 
industries could not ‘pass on’ higher costs in the world’s commodity markets in which 
they were price takers. Primary producers and miners were caught between upward 
pressures on costs and a commodity cycle that turned downwards from the mid-1920s 
before collapsing in 1929.56  
 
Agricultural economists would predict a relative contraction in the size of the primary 
sector over the long term because of the underlying elasticity of demand and supply.57 As 
income grows the demand for foodstuffs does not rise proportionately. Freebairn reports 
that the estimates for the income elasticity for foodstuffs in Australia range from 0.21 to 
0.76.58 This would have been the case in export markets as well. Demand for the products 
of Australian’s rural producers and miners grew more slowly as incomes rose at home 
and abroad. The prospects facing primary producers turned against them in the inter-war 
period as world demand and supply schedules shifted inward and outward, respectively, 
turning the terms of trade sharply against them. Demand for wool and mineral products 
such as coal and iron ore and non-ferrous metals was hostage to the fortunes facing those 
products that used them as inputs. Prices of Australian exports were softened by slower 
                                                 
51 Forster, Industrial Development, p.224. 
52 Thomas, ‘Manufacturing’, p. 267. See pp. 255-260. 
53 Forster, ‘Economies of scale’, pp. 167-8. 
54 Frank Eyre, ed, Technology in Australia 1788-1988 (Melbourne: Academy of Technological Sciences 
and Engineering), 1988. See Michael E. Porter, Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing Industries 
and Competitors (New York: The Free Press), 1980, pp. 17-23. 
55 F. R. E. Mauldon, Mechanisation in Australian Industries (Hobart: University of Tasmania), 1938, 
Tables XI, XII and XIII, pp. 40 (a) and (b), 57 and 62. 
56 B. Pinkstone, Global Connections: A History of Exports and the Australian Economy (Canberra: 
Australian Government Publishing Service), 1992. 
57 For an excellent discussion see John W. Freebairn, ‘Natural resource industries’, in Maddock and 
McLean, Australian Economy in the Long Run, pp. 144-63. 
58 Freebairn, ‘Natural resource industries’, p. 146. 
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growth in Western Europe markets in the 1920s and by improvements in efficiency in 
production processes. Moreover, an excess of supply entering the world economy in the 
1920s precipitated a dramatic drop in prices in 1929 and depressed them for the rest of 
the decade.59  
 
Increasing productivity in primary industries meant that demand could be met with a 
smaller share of resources, especially labour. Sinclair has argued that the rural frontier 
was closing by the 1920s.60 This signaled the end to a century old ‘model’ of economic 
development that involved bringing more and more land into production. Declining 
rainfall as farmers moved inland set the geographic limits for settlement. Farming 
practices, particularly repeated plantings of wheat, was diminishing soil fertility. A 
corollary is an inelastic supply schedule with respect to price for Australian farm 
products after the 1920s. In contrast, Freebairn presents a more optimistic picture with a 
range of technical advances offsetting the caprices of nature.61 The slower expansion in 
area under crop in the 1930s would seem to have been the result of falling prices rather 
than declining marginal productivity.62
 
A combination of low income elasticity of demand for primary products and an elastic 
supply response can account for a ‘natural’ process of long term decline in the 
importance of the sector in the economy. Was this process accelerated by the ‘excess 
cost’ imposed by the tariff? Insofar as farmers and miners purchased imported inputs 
whose prices were inflated by the tariff, the answer would be in the affirmative. 
However, there were a number of offsetting effects. The distribution of the ‘burden’ fell 
unevenly amongst the various agricultural and mining industries. In the late 1930s the 
majority of farm products exported less than a half of their output, with wool, dried vine 
fruits and wheat as the outliers.63 Home price support schemes lifted domestic prices 
above export prices for a number of products, most notably dairy products, dried vine 
fruits, canned fruits, wine and sugar. The aggregate level of support given to the farm 
sector had come to exceed that received by manufacturing in 1932-33.64 It is likely that 
this figure rose further as a result of the ‘operation of substantial Commonwealth and 
State programs for special financial assistance, bounties, debt adjustment, and reappraisal 
of capital values and rentals of crown lands.’65 Rural assistance may have prevented a 
faster outflow of resources from the farm sector in the 1930s. Moreover, the mining 
industries recovered their position in the economy strongly in the 1930s as a result of the 
                                                 
59 Folke Hilgerdt, Industrialization and Foreign Trade (Geneva: League of Nations), 1945; Ingvar 
Svennilson, Growth and Stagnation in the European Economy (Geneva: United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe), 1954. 
60 W. A. Sinclair, Australian Economic Development: Old Model and New Model (Nedlands: University of 
Western Australia Press), 1977. See also W. A. Sinclair, The Process of Economic Development in 
Australia (Melbourne: Cheshire), 1976. 
61 Freebairn, ‘Natural resource industries’, pp. 136-39 & 149-53. 
62 J. G. Crawford, C. M. Donald, C. P. Dowsett and D. B. Williams and A. A. Ross, Wartime Agriculture in 
Australia and New Zealand 1939-50 (Stanford: Stanford University Press), 1954, pp. 16-20. 
63 Crawford, et.al., Wartime Agriculture, Table 4, p. 16. 
64 See note 16 above.  
65 Crawford, et.al., Wartime Agriculture, p.18. See also Freebairn, ‘Natural resource industries’, p. 138. 
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rising price of gold and as coal and base metals were subject to higher levels of domestic 
demand to generate electricity and feed the furnaces of the metal industries.66  
 
Services: the elephant in the room
 
As shown in Tables 1 and 2 above, services dominate both the farm sector and 
manufacturing in terms of both employment and output with shares of above 40 per cent. 
Students of the services sector in advanced economies, beginning with Fischer and Clark, 
had argued that this industry would ‘naturally’ expand relative to other sectors because of 
its above unity income elasticity of demand and its lower levels of labour productivity.67 
As incomes rose, consumers would spend disproportionately on services rather than 
foodstuffs or commodities. Moreover, the nature of production of most services, highly 
labour intensive and non-storable, would not permit the sorts of productivity increases 
occurring elsewhere in the economy. Consequently, the share of employment in the 
service sector would be expected to rise more rapidly than its share of product.  
 
One of the key questions we face in discussing structural change in the Australian 
economy is the modest growth in services share of output and its constant share of 
employment. This leads to a consideration of two issues. The first is the rate at which 
incomes and the demand for services grew. A comparison of per capita GDP figures 
suggests little growth from the depression of the 1890s until World War II. Butlin refers 
to a ‘drastic retardation’ when compared to the earlier and later periods.68 However, this 
pessimistic view has been challenged on a number of conceptual and empirical grounds 
by other scholars.69 They suggest that GDP has been underestimated because the way it 
has been calculated fails to capture the value of the consumption of public sector 
infrastructure. Moreover, they point to a number of partial measures that suggest living 
standards had risen appreciably such as increased life expectancy, shorter working hours, 
earlier retirement ages, better quality housing, higher education attainments and 
widespread ownership of consumer durables. Factoring in the effects of alternate 
consumption deflators, shorter hours, earlier retirement and increased life expectancy 
would substantially life the growth of per capita GDP.70 These upward revisions make the 
small growth in the share of services compared to manufacturing all the more puzzling.   
                                                 
66 Gold production rose from 470,000 fine ounces in 1930 to 1,650,000 in 1939. The amount of iron ore 
mined rose from 935,000 tons in 1930 to 2,580,000 tons in 1939. The amount of coal consumed 
domestically, black coal production less exports plus brown coal, rose from 11.4 million tons in 1930 to 
16.8 million tons in 1939. Z. Kalix, L. M. Fraser and R. I. Rawson, Australian Mineral Industry: 
Production and Trade, 1842-1964 (Canberra: Bureau of Mineral Resources, Geology and Geophysics), 
1966, pp. 177, 214 and 93, 95, 106-7. 
67 For excellent surveys of the literature and data on Australian services see J. A Dowie, ‘The service 
ensemble’ in Forster, ed, Australian Economic Development, pp. 208-65 and Michael Carter, ‘The service 
sector’ in Maddock and McLean, eds, Australian Economy in the Long Run, pp. 195-226. 
68 N. G. Butlin, ‘Some perspectives’, in Forster, ed, Australian Economic Development, Table 6.6, p. 284. 
See also, Butlin, ‘Long-run trends in Australian per capita consumption’, in K. Hancock, ed, The National 
Income and Social Welfare (Melbourne: Cheshire), 1965, pp. 1-19. 
69 Ian W. McLean and Jonathon Pincus, ‘Did Australian living standards stagnate between 1890 and 
1940?’, Journal of Economic History, 43, 1, 1983, pp. 193-202; Ian W. McLean, ‘Economic wellbeing’ in 
Maddock and McLean, eds, Australian Economy in the Long Run, pp. 319-43. 
70 McLean and Pincus, ‘Did Australian living standards stagnate’, Table 2, p. 201. 
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The second issue is whether productivity levels were lower and growth rates slower in the 
service sector than elsewhere? After a careful review of the issues, Carter concludes that 
the ‘evidence does not support the conventional wisdom that service industries on the 
whole produce a lower output per worker and have increased their productivity at a lower 
rate than manufacturing or agriculture.’71 This view would again provide a partial 
explanation for the failure for services, particularly its share of employment, to have 
grown relative to the rest of the economy. 
 
Study of changes of the composition of the service industries throw up further 
questions.72 Those industries that might be expected to have the highest income elasticity 
of demand and low productivity growth, the ‘luxuries’ of restaurants, clubs and hotels, 
and personal services and domestic services, stagnated or lost ground. Alternative 
explanations to those of income elasticity and low productivity levels are required. Carter 
provides two explanations of the demand for services that have differing impacts on the 
growth of the sector. The first involves a substitution of goods for services as the relative 
prices react to slower productivity growth in services. The examples given are wealthy 
households substituting motor cars for public transport and household durables to 
substitute for domestic service and entertainment. The availability of an alternate set of 
manufactured goods that substitute for service activity, all of which are products of the 
second industrial revolution, is a pre-condition for these consumption decisions whose 
net effect is to slow the growth of the service sector.  By way of contrast, the expansion 
of services to businesses and government for intermediate rather than final demand 
purposes drove the growth of the service sector independently of income elasticity or 
productivity. The growth of business services in the broad was ‘simply a result of 
increasing specialization and division of labour.’73  
 
The role of the government as a provider of services also helps to explain the size and 
composition of the industry. Political decisions led to increasing state outlays on service 
such as the provision of public administration, health and educational services, the 
gradual ‘nationalization’ of water and sewerage, power and gas, and urban transport 
systems. Moreover, public sector investment rose significantly compared to private non-
residential investment, reflecting commitments to both rural and increasingly urban 
needs, infrastructure in the latter being a lagged response to population growth and 
industrialization.74 However, industry classifications used by Butlin in his estimations of 
GDP make it impossible to distinguish between publicly and privately provided 
services.75
 
An Alternative Explanation of Structural Change 
 
The existing literature provides a gloomy picture of the Australian economy in the first 
four decades of the twentieth century. It had been subject to strong cyclical effects, two 
                                                 
71 Carter, ‘The service sector’, p.207. 
72 Carter, ‘The service sector’, Table 8.5, p. 214. 
73 Carter, ‘The service sector, p. 222. 
74 Sinclair, ‘Capital formation’. 
75 Butlin, Australian Domestic Product, and ‘Perspectives.’ 
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depressions and a war. Moreover, its trend rate of per capita growth was disappointing. 
Part of the reason for this was because public policy shifted resources towards industries 
with lower productivity than the export oriented rural industries. Australia’s competitive 
position in the international economy was weakened as productivity in its manufacturing 
was well below that of its trading partners. Insult was added to injury as the protection of 
manufacturing imposed greater costs on the rural industries so disadvantaging them in 
export markets.  
 
An alternative view is that the Australian economy was dynamic in that entrepreneurs 
and business people responded to the many opportunities presented to them. Our 
contention is that the nature of the Australian economy was markedly different in 1939 
from what it had been in 1900. The range of goods and services on offer was far wider. 
Changes in consumption patterns provided opportunities for firms to develop new 
markets, Edith Penrose’s interstices.76 The technologies underpinning production and 
distribution were far more advanced. Cost functions were realigned by the adoption of 
new technology, much of which was labour saving. Changes in demand and supply 
schedules across the economy prompted firms to adjust their behaviours in an attempt to 
lift profitability or to ward off failure. Shifts in demand and supply factors were played 
out in thousands of micro-markets in which firms competed. Factors exogenous to the 
firms were responsible for some of the shifts in both the demand and supply schedules. 
However, firms increasingly built the capabilities to influence the demand for their 
products through branding and advertising, and to create superior production 
technologies. The resultant effect on changes in demand and supply factors over time was 





A number of powerful drivers of change can be identified on the demand side. There was 
a strong demonstration effect from the United States and the United Kingdom about what 
was on offer. Australians wanted to experience what was new and different. The 1920s in 
particular was a decade of experimentation. Expenditure patterns shifted under the weight 
of three forces: a growing demand for consumer durables; a growing preference for 
entertainment and leisure activities; and the emergence of a new category of expenditure, 
fast moving consumer goods. 
 
Australian consumers and producers were aware of the new consumer products, 
particularly consumer durables, coming onto markets in North America and Europe after 
WWI. Immigrants brought this personal knowledge with them. Australian residents saw 
this ‘new’ world through the medium of letters from relatives living abroad, newspapers, 
magazines and cinema and in shop windows. They observed the purchases of their family 
and friends. What might have seemed unobtainable luxuries became necessities for more 
                                                 
76 Edith Penrose, Theory of the Growth of the Firm (Oxford: Basil Blackwell), 1959. 
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and more families under the siren call of advertising.77 Household budgets were 
rearranged in the light of an expanding set of products and services. 
 
The decade of the 1920s has been identified as the beginning of Australia’s progress to 
becoming ‘a modern consumer society.’78 A sufficient number of households possessed 
the discretionary income to purchase motor cars and a range of household appliances. 
Hire purchase facilities allowed the cost to be spread over a number of years. Whitwell 
argues that these expenditures rose rapidly in the second half of the decade before falling 
away in the depression and war. The extraordinary growth of consumer spending after 
1945 was the start of a new era rather than a continuation of a longer process.79 However, 
there are a range of indicators to suggest that the demand for consumer durables 
continued strongly throughout the 1930s. For instance, the sale of radios quickened 
markedly. In 1929 there was one radio licence for every 20 people. Within a decade the 
number had risen to one in six. The number of telephones in use also rose from one in 
every 12 people in 1929 to one in every ten by 1939. Motor car sales continued to grow 
throughout the 1930s. The number of motor vehicles registered, including motor cars, 
commercial vehicles and motor cycles, rose from one for every 12 people to one in every 
eight and a half. More people were driving. The number of people licensed to drive rose 
from one in every 43 in 1919, to one in every eight in 1929 and to one in every six in 
1939. They drove further during the 1930s with the volume of petrol consumed rising 
faster than the number of registered vehicles, 75 compared to 50 per cent.80
 
The increased consumption of motor vehicles and household consumer durables such as 
radios, washing machines, refrigerators, vacuum cleaners and the like necessarily lagged 
behind investments in the construction of sealed roads and the provision of electricity and 
gas. State and local governments made those investments on a large scale in the 1920s 
and 1930s.81 Private providers had also entered the energy sector from the late nineteenth 
century. A hybrid system of state and private providers continued up to WWII but the 
government utilities absorbed many of the smaller private firms. An increasing number of 
households were connected to gas and electricity. Whitwell reports that 34 per cent of 
homes in Australia had electricity in 1923 and that the number rose sharply later in the 
decade.82 Further growth was experienced in the 1930s. By 1939 all the electricity 
providers in Victoria, the SECV and the rest, had 397,944 customers, in an area that held 
                                                 
77 For estimates of amounts spent on advertising through different medium see W. A. McNair, Radio 
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85 per cent of the State’s population. 83 The number connected was more than three-
quarters of all the dwellings, shops and factories in the state.84 The 1947 Census confirms 
an almost complete coverage of private houses in the metropolitan cities, 97 per cent of 
houses were connected to electricity. 83 per cent were connected to gas, and nearly three-
quarters used a gas stove.85 Nationwide, 78 per cent of private dwellings had electricity; 
just two points shy of the figure for the United States of America in 1941.86
 
There was a growing market for electrical appliances which provided opportunities for 
local producers and distributors. A substantial electrical manufacturing industry had been 
established in the 1920s.87 It continued to expand in the 1930s as sales of washing 
machines, vacuum cleaners, refrigerators and gas cookers and heaters continued to grow. 
The market was served by a combination of local manufacturers, many of whom were 
foreign owned, and importers. The distribution channels ranged from door to door 
salesmen, to specialist stores and department stores. Hire purchase or some form of 
vendor finance was common for the more expensive items.88  
 
Consumption patterns altered in the face of rising incomes, the advent of new 
technologies and shorter hours. More was spent on entertainment and leisure pursuits. 
Two illustrations suffice to make the point. First, the popular entertainments of the 
nineteenth century, the circus, music hall and live theatre, were challenged by the arrival 
of the cinema in the 1920s. The speed with which it became a mass medium is 
astonishing.89 By 1927 there were 1,250 theatres that had sold 110 million tickets that 
year. Gross receipts were £5.5 million. Investment in the theatres was estimated to be £25 
million and 20,000 people worked in the industry.90 Sport and recreation played an 
increasingly important part in Australian life. School children were dragooned into 
organized physical activity. Participation was fostered through school, church, 
neighbourhood and district competitions covering every sport from archery to volley ball. 
Their parents might choose fishing, sailing, bowls or golf. Recreational activity became 
institutionalized with state and national organizations taking charge in all of the major 
sporting codes. Sport became mass entertainment as attendances at football matches, test 
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cricket and racing rose.91 Much of the infrastructure was provided by local government 
and churches. However, there were plenty of opportunities left for businessmen.92 The 
demand for sporting equipment and specialized apparel including footwear grew.93 Large 
crowds at cricket grounds, boxing stadiums and race tracks required transport, food and 
drink, and at the latter, gambling facilities. Posters, tickets and programs gave additional 
work to printers and newspapers’ sports sections feed the public’s demand for results and 
information.  
 
Fast moving consumer goods became an important part of expenditure patterns after 
WWI. Until that time the category would have been confined to a small range of 
products, cigarettes, pipe tobacco, toiletries and confectionery. The list lengthened in the 
1920s and 1930s to include cosmetics such as face creams, lipstick, nail polish,94 
toothpaste and over the counter drugs such as ‘Aspro’.95 Confectionery also became big 
business as the homemade or unbranded sweets of pre-WWI were replaced by branded 
chocolates and toffees, and chewing gum. The soft drink market was transformed by the 
adoption of the crown seal and commercial refrigeration.96 Children became important 
consumers in their own right, not only through their expenditures of pocket money but as 
a new segment in the food market. The first wave of convenience foods for breakfast, 
cereals, school lunches, vegemite and processed cheese, and after school and bed time 
snacks, ice cream, milk chocolate and cocoa came from the giant foreign food 
corporations of Kellogg’s, Kraft, Nestle, Cadbury’s and the local Peters.97 These types of 
products, along with canned fruit and baked beans, came in new and improved forms of 
packaging.   
 
Supply Side Shifts 
 
The economy was also experiencing a number of important changes on the supply side 
that would in turn disturb existing equilibrium positions. Three will be considered briefly 
below. The first is the marked increase in specialization of function; the second is a 
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refashioning of distribution channels; and the third is the growing importance of 
intellectual property as a firm resource and as a source of competitive advantage. 
 
The expansion of the economy in the first half of the twentieth century permitted 
increased specialization of function across the board. Butlin argues that the ‘gradual 
separation’ of the ‘institutional combination of manufacturing, trade and transport 
function, the confusion of rural production, construction, transport and selling activities’ 
was a ‘basic feature of pre-1914 and interwar growth.’ This might, a priori, ‘enlarge 
opportunities for increased efficiency.’98 Specialization could reduce costs independent of 
scale as firms improve efficiency as a result of cumulative experience.99 Evidence of the 
growth in specialization can be found in trade directories. Here firms advertise their 
wares to buyers. A review of the ‘Index to professions and trades Melbourne and 
suburbs’ in the Sands & McDougall’s Directory of Victoria100 in 1920, 1930 and 1939 
reveals significant change. There were 48 new categories in the 1930 edition compared to 
1920, and another 218 categories in 1939 compared to 1930. The new entrants were 
spread across services and manufacturing. The professions splintered into highly 
specialist groups, particularly amongst chemists and engineers. Specialist intermediaries 
and wholesalers abounded, including the valuers and auctioneers making a market in 
second hand machinery. The list of manufacturing trades show the rapid emergence of 
new industries such as air conditioning, Christmas cards, gramophone records, ice cream 
cones and wafers, hearing aids and spectacles. 
 
This process of specialization was particularly evident in wholesale and retail 
distribution. The role of the importing wholesaler, once the most important conduit 
between Australian retailers and their foreign suppliers, was diminishing. The tariff 
played its part. However, many of the larger retailers, particularly the department stores, 
established their own buying offices abroad.101 Increasingly, these large metropolitan 
city-based stores either integrated backwards into production or formed close links with 
domestic producers in relationships that exhibited considerable countervailing power. 
Sidney Myer’s store in Bourke Street, Melbourne, borrowing freely from models in the 
United States, became the pace setter for department stores in the 1920s and 1930s. New 
types of specialist retailer were emerging. Chain stores such as Moran and Cato in 
groceries, O.Gilpin’s in drapery and ironmongery, and G. J. Coles in variety goods were 
well advanced before 1939.102 The expanding use of the motor car brought dealerships, 
garages selling petrol and providing repairs, and used car lots in its wake. The general 
store was challenged by specialist retailers, such as grocers, Manchester, hardware and 
                                                 
98 Butlin, ‘ Perspectives’, p. 315. 
99 Porter, Competitive Strategy, pp.11-2. 
100 Sands & McDougall’s Directory of Victoria ( Melbourne: Sands & McDougall), 1920, 1930 and 1939. 
101 R. W. Dalton, Economic and Trade Conditions in Australia to August 1929 (London: His Majesty’s 
Stationery Office), 1929, pp. 181-99. 
102 Ambrose Pratt, Sidney Myer: A Biography (Melbourne: Quartet Books), 1978; Ann Blainey, If God 
Prospers Me: A Portarit of Frederick John Cato (Burwood, Vic: Chandos Publishing  Company), 1990; 
Judith McLaughlin, Nothing Over Half a Crown: A Personal History of the Founder of the G. J. Coles 
Stores (Main Ridge, Vic: Loch Haven Books), 1991; Muriel Penny, Just a Pocket for the Money: The 
History of Oliver Gilpin and His Stores ( published privately), 1995. 
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home wares.103 The clothing stores segmented the market into women’s and men’s 
clothes, and youths and children. Moreover, hats, corsets, fur coats, gloves and shoes for 
women would be sold in different establishments. Purchases were driven by events such 
as parties and weddings, the changing season and fashions rather than need. New forms 
of food retailers started to trade in the 1930s, delicatessens, soda fountains and the soon 
to be ubiquitous milk bar.104  
 
Additions to capital stock have figured prominently in the explanations of output and 
productivity growth before WWII.105 It is important to also recognize the growing 
importance of intellectual property to firms. Knowledge and know how was embedded in 
organizational routines.106 Australian firms imported technology on a large scale, a 
process that often included the transfer of machinery, blue prints and skilled workers to 
assemble and train the local operatives. Examples can be drawn from steel, glass and 
fertilizer industries.107 Businesses sought exclusive access to their own technology 
through patents and to imported technology and the products it could make through the 
licensing agreements. Products were branded and heavily promoted where ever possible. 
Firms registered trade marks and paid fees to foreign firms use their trade marks on 
products made under licence to protect their property rights. These intangible assets were 
a source of competitive advantage to firms and a source of barriers to entry and mobility 
in many industries. Further, their existence was a factor contributing to differing rates of 
profits between and within industries.108  
 
Changes in demand or in supply conditions had widespread repercussions across the 
economy. The point is most simply made with reference to motor cars and electricity. 
The growing demand for motor cars affected a number of up stream industries other than 
car companies such as oil companies, road construction contractors, suppliers of 
aggregate and asphalt, manufacturers and installers of tariff signals. Consumption of 
motor cars generated a new class of insurance risk, signaling increased competition 
within the insurance industry, and spurred the development of the hire purchase industry. 
Down stream garages sprang up to provide fuel, service and repair cars, with panel 
beaters and spray painters emerging as separate entities. Used car yards, wreckers and 
scrap metal merchants dealt with the older models. Motorists formed associations that 
vigorously promoted their interests against competing users of road space.109 Commercial 
users of motor trucks, buses and cars arose apace. The truck became a major source of 
                                                 
103 The Victorian government licensed all shops from 1915 onwards. The first return in 1916 divides shops 
into 28 categories. An ‘electrical and radio’ category was added in 1933. The number of shops rose from 
25,635 in 1916 to 41,127 in 1938. Annual Report of the Chief Inspector of Factories and Shops, Victoria 
Papers Presented to Parliament, various. 
104 Sands & McDougall’s, 1939. 
105 Forster, Industrial Development; Idem, ‘Economies of Scale’; Butlin, ‘Perspectives’; Sinclair, ‘Capital 
formation.’ 
106 This point appeals to the literature of the resource-based view of the firm. 
107 Helen Hughes, Australian Iron and Steel Industry 1842-1962 ( Melbourne: Melbourne University 
press), 1962; Diane Hutchinson, Cumming Smith; Helen Fountain, AGM 
108 M. E. Porter, ‘The structure within industries and companies’ performance’, Review of Economics and 
Statistics, 61, 2, 1979, pp. 214-27. 
109 Graeme Davison with Sheryl Yelland, Car Wars: How the Car Won Our Hearts and Conquered Our 
Cities (Crows Nest, NSW: Allen & Unwin), 2004. 
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transport in the 1930s, while bus and taxi fleets110 also expanded. Electricity generation 
had a pervasive impact on the economy. It reached back to the domestic coal mining 
industry as a source of energy and spawned hydroelectric schemes. Heavy engineering 
met its needs for both generation and transmission. Power was essential for the expansion 
of the telephone network, which had its own feedback loop to business productivity by 
reducing communication costs. Power to factories greatly increased their productivity. In 
the 1930s many small tools such as drills and grinders, once hand tools, were fixed to a 
bench and power driven. The capacity of pumps and compressors also increased.111 
Electricity transformed offices by being used for lighting, lifts, hot water systems, air 
conditioning, refrigeration, and to power office equipment such as calculating machines. 
By the late 1930s electrical appliances had invaded every room in the house. The State 
Electricity Commission of Victoria, for instance, boasted that there were 21 types of 




If we shift our attention from the issues of Australia’s comparative advantage and its 
costs and productivity relative to those of its trading partners a different picture emerges. 
During the first four decades of the twentieth century the economy added to its stock of 
resources: labour, capital and technology or know how. The allocation of these resources 
within the economy altered significantly, manufacturing grew, the rural sector shrank by 
the same amount and the tertiary sector remained roughly constant. The question is what 
motivated this reallocation. The conventional story has been one of tariffs and subsidies 
interfering with relative prices. We contend that this is at best a partial explanation as it 
applies only to the ‘tradeable’ sector of the economy. The size and composition of the 
large tertiary sector remains unexplained. Moreover, the tariffs and subsidies story does 
not provide a convincing explanation of how profits in manufacturing would rise both 
absolutely and relatively after an increase in the tariff. 
 
McLean and Pincus offered the tantalizing comment that ‘there is the possibility that the 
nature of economic growth [between 1890 and 1940] was different from that in the 
preceding and subsequent periods of much faster growth…’113 We would agree that the 
process of growth is not well understood. Our contention is that new opportunities for 
profitable investment were becoming available in many parts of the economy because of 
changes on the demand and supply side. Many of these changes were exogenous to 
Australia. The demonstration effect was strong for both households and businesses. 
Information about new products and services, and the technology required to produce 
them flowed freely into the country. Households shifted their preferences towards 
consumer durables, entertainment and leisure and fast moving consumer goods. These 
                                                 
110 A fleet of 101 Yellow Cabs starting operating in Melbourne in 1923, joining the 800 independent taxis 
already in business. Vince Kelly, Achieving a Vision: The Life Story of P. W. Tewksbury Australian 
Industrial Pioneer (Sydney: George M. Dash), no date, 3rd ed, revised, pp. 91-99. 
111 McPherson’s Catalogue Tools and Machinery (Melbourne), 1929 and 1937 
112 Ramsay’s Architectural and Engineering Catalogue (Melbourne: Ramsay Standard Catalogue Service 
Pty. Ltd.), 1941 edition, section 38-3, pp. 1-24. 
113 McLean and Pincus, ‘Did Australian living standards stagnate’, p. 196. 
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decisions were at the heart of Snooks’114 discussion of the changing boundaries between 
household and total economy. Up to WWII households were increasingly ‘buying’ goods 
and services that were previously produced and consumed within the family unit. Large 
scale investment in public infrastructure was a precondition that had been largely met by 
the mid-1920s. Increased profits awaited those firms first to market or who could develop 
a sustainable competitive advantage. Changes on the supply side such as the efficiency 
gains associated with specialization, new distribution channels to satisfy customer 
demands and a growing reliance on inimitable proprietary assets provide additional or 
complementary paths to profitable investments. Finally, we argue that the outcomes of 
these shifts in both demand and supply had large scale linkage effects across the 
economy. 
 
                                                 
114 Graeme D. Snooks, Portrait of the Family within the Total Economy: A Study in Longrun Dynamics, 
Australia 1788-1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1994. 
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Table 1. Shares of employment by sector [per cent] 
 Primary Manufacturing Services Tertiary 
1900-01 33.0 14.7 42.3 52.3 
1910-11 30.5 18.8 41.1 50.7 
1926-27 24.0 20.5 42.0 55.4 
1937-38 23.9 23.5 42.0 52.6 
Note: Mining is included in Primary. Tertiary is Services plus Construction. 
Source: Dowie (1970), Table 5.4, p. 231. 
 
Table 2: Share of product by sector at current prices [per cent] 
 Primary Manufacturing Services Tertiary 
1900-01 36.6 12.9 42.9 50.5 
1910-11 32.9 14.5 44.4 52.6 
1926-27 26.4 16.4 46.6 57.3 
1937-38 28.2 18.0 45.5 53.8 
Notes: Data from ‘Butlin’ column. Mining is included in Primary. Tertiary is Services 
plus Construction. 







SUMMARY OUTPUT        
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0.207183        
R Square 0.042925        
Adjusted R 
Square 0.030164        
Standard Error 1.337281        
Observations 77        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F 
Significance 
F    
Regression 1 6.01548 6.01548 3.363759 0.070612    
Residual 75 134.124 1.788321      
Total 76 140.1395          
         
  Coefficients 
Standard 







Intercept 3.561129 1.860543 1.914027 0.059432 -0.14526 7.26752 -0.14526 7.2





SUMMARY OUTPUT  
  
Regression Statistics  
Multiple R 0.96821741  
R Square 0.937444954  
Adjusted R Square 0.867939347  
Standard Error 5657.552561  
Observations 20  
  
ANOVA  
 df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 10 4.32E+09 4.32E+08 13.48733 0.000295 
Residual 9 2.88E+08 32007901  
Total 19 4.61E+09  
  
 Coefficients Standard 
Error 








Intercept 12367.14979 1318.409 9.38036 6.08E-06 9384.702 15349.6 9384.702 15349.6
duty % -88.1878486 124.5716 -0.70793 0.496912 -369.988 193.6128 -369.988 193.6128
bricks -11267.4821 3800.142 -2.96502 0.01583 -19864 -2670.96 -19864 -2670.96
drugs -4473.7254 4693.702 -0.95313 0.365418 -15091.6 6144.166 -15091.6 6144.166
metals 38326.99181 3811.946 10.05444 3.42E-06 29703.77 46950.21 29703.77 46950.21
jewelley -11596.3988 3803.952 -3.04851 0.013826 -20201.5 -2991.26 -20201.5 -2991.26
clothing 13162.06486 3798.682 3.464903 0.007106 4568.85 21755.28 4568.85 21755.28
leather -4111.42564 3810.575 -1.07895 0.308675 -12731.5 4508.695 -12731.5 4508.695
food -12.2057969 3798.655 -0.00321 0.997506 -8605.36 8580.949 -8605.36 8580.949
wood -1543.95037 3850.401 -0.40098 0.697785 -10254.2 7166.262 -10254.2 7166.262
paper -5081.73421 3844.372 -1.32186 0.218824 -13778.3 3614.838 -13778.3 3614.838




















Chart 2. Average rate of duty on dutiable imports, 1903-39
0.0
10.0
20.0
30.0
40.0
50.0
60.0
70.0
19
03
19
05
19
07
19
09
19
11
19
13
19
14
-15
19
16
-17
19
18
-19
19
20
-21
19
22
-23
19
24
-25
19
26
-27
19
28
-29
19
30
-31
19
32
-33
19
34
-35
19
36
-37
19
38
-39
%
 d
ut
y
D/Dutiable
 
 27
